Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104605zbMath1518.91308OpenAlexW4317214559MaRDI QIDQ6164825
Publication date: 4 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104605
optimal stoppingprincipal-agent modeladverse selectioncontinuous timeirreversible investmentprocurementreal optiondynamic contracting
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
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