Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3zbMath1273.91258OpenAlexW2061688005MaRDI QIDQ375021

David Besanko

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs