The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01283-ZMaRDI QIDQ2059063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dawen Meng, Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 13 December 2021

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01283-z

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityentry deterrencelong-term contractnetwork effectnonlinear pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Cites work

• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
• Exclusive versus non-exclusive dealing in auctions with resale
• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Network externalities and long-run market shares
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
• Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Cited in

(4)

• Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals
• Dynamic mechanism design on social networks
• Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach
• Pro-competitive horizontal merger with cost reducing investments and network externalities

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