The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01283-zzbMath1479.91176OpenAlexW3034705123MaRDI QIDQ2059063

Guoqiang Tian, Dawen Meng

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01283-z

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitynonlinear pricingentry deterrencenetwork effectlong-term contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Cites Work

• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
• Network externalities and long-run market shares
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• Uncertainty and entry deterrence
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Optimal dynamic contracting: The first‐order approach and beyond
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

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