Preemptive entry in differentiated product markets

DOI10.1007/PL00004112zbMATH Open0979.91075OpenAlexW2047905853MaRDI QIDQ5940586FDOQ5940586

Authors Simon P. Anderson, Maxim Engers

Publication date 9 August 2001

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004112

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationentry timingrent dissipationsequential entryentry deterence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Timing of entry and location/product differentiation
• Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game
• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Uneven spacing in free-entry equilibrium for spatial product differentiation
• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game

Cited in

(10)

• The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
• First mover advantage by product proliferation in multiproduct duopoly
• Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game
• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Timing of entry and location/product differentiation
• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information
• Dynamic entry in vertically differentiated markets
• Global and local players in a model of spatial competition
• Differentiated industries without entry barriers

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