Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0604-YMaRDI QIDQ2580973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alberto Bisin, Adriano A. Rampini

Publication date 10 January 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/27299

zbMATH Keywords

BankruptcyNon-exclusive contracts.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets
• Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Endogenous credit limits with small default costs

Cited in

(9)

• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
• Counterparty risk externality: centralized versus over-the-counter markets
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets
• Smoothing sudden stops
• Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship
• Optimal bankruptcy code: a fresh start for some
• Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies*

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