Bankruptcy and firm finance

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0267-yzbMath1149.91038MaRDI QIDQ929351

Tridib Sharma, Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date: 17 June 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y

zbMATH Keywords

Inflation; Bankruptcy; Debt; Default; Contracts; Creditor protection; Enforcement; Legal environment; Limited commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

Related Items

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation, Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts, Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts, Credit and self-employment, The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis, Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement, A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization, Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks, Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification, Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy, Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment, Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

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