Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
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Publication:1146099
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0zbMath0446.90007OpenAlexW2147560556MaRDI QIDQ1146099
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0
asymmetric informationcompetitive marketsoptimal contractsallocation of resourcescostly state verificationcostly information transmissiontwo- agent pure exchange economyuncertainty about nature
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