The price of size and financial market allocations

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0042-XzbMATH Open1109.91032OpenAlexW2154480943MaRDI QIDQ852329FDOQ852329

Authors: Zhixiong Zeng 

Publication date: 29 November 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/res2004/Zeng.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

endogenous asset indivisibilitynonlinear financial contractprice of sizevalue of firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example

Cited In (6)

• A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
• Firm size, bank size, and financial development
• Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models
• Size matters for OTC market makers: General results and dimensionality reduction techniques
• The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
• The firm-size relation and stock market responses to post-1962 changes in Federal Reserve margin levels

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