Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.05.005MaRDI QIDQ848613zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Naveen Khanna, Mark Schroder

Publication date 4 March 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdebtpredationcontract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Convex Programming and Duality in Normed Space
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification

Cited in

(5)

• Debt financing in a duopoly with asymmetric costs
• Efficient sourcing and debt financing in imperfect product markets
• The strategic effects of long-term debt in imperfect competition
• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• Debt and capacity commitments

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