Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0461-1zbMATH Open1231.91284OpenAlexW3123061497MaRDI QIDQ976769FDOQ976769

Authors: Hans K. Hvide, Tore E. Leite 

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0461-1

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zbMATH Keywords

debt contractcostly state verificationpriority violationstrategic defaults

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Credit risk (91G40) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Optimal multilateral contracts
• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
• Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt

Cited In (15)

• Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
• A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
• The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
• Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis

Uses Software

• Prosper

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