Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0461-1MaRDI QIDQ976769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans K. Hvide, Tore E. Leite

Publication date 16 June 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0461-1

zbMATH Keywords

debt contractcostly state verificationpriority violationstrategic defaults

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Credit risk (91G40) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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Cites work

• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal multilateral contracts
• Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information

Cited in

(23)

• Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
• Disputes, debt, and equity
• Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry
• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
• A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers
• Design of bank credit contract with punishment mechanism
• First-best debt relief
• The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
• The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
• Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
• Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts
• Debt, equity, and information
• Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis

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