Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers

DOI10.1007/S10100-013-0319-2MaRDI QIDQ302124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Csóka, Dániel Havran, Nóra Szűcs

Publication date 4 July 2016

Published in CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1322.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

game theorytrade creditmoral hazardcorporate financing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

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Cites work

• Bank Market Power and SME Financing Constraints*
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Optimisation of short term commercial bank loans to corporates in terms of financing operating activities in Slovenia

Cited in

(5)

• The incentive model in supply chain with trade credit and default risk
• Default risk and corporate governance in financial vs. non-financial firms
• Editorial
• Economic Capital Allocation for Corporate Borrowers Credit Risk Coverage
• State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

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