The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90067-TzbMATH Open0716.90013OpenAlexW1995220622MaRDI QIDQ753636FDOQ753636

Authors: Chun Chang 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90067-t

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zbMATH Keywords

two-period modelcostly state verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Existence theorems for weak and usual optimal solutions in Lagrange problems with unilateral constraints. I
• On normal hazard in general equilibrium theory

Cited In (17)

• Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
• Relational enforcement
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry
• Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
• A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
• Modelling nominal debt contracts and fixed rate debt
• Optimal multilateral contracts
• Financial contract structures and production decision: an option-based optimization
• Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
• Dynamic costly state verification
• Optimal multilateral contracts
• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

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