Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0856-5MaRDI QIDQ2354546zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cesar E. Tamayo

Publication date 20 July 2015

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0856-5

zbMATH Keywords

financial contractsinvestor protectionrisk aversionstandard debt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Credit rationing or entrepreneurial risk aversion? An alternative explanation for the Evans and Jovanovic finding
• Dynamic costly state verification
• Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

Cited in

(6)

• Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting
• Firm asset structure and risk aversion
• The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification
• Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth
• An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
• The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs

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