Relational enforcement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6565784
DOI10.3982/TE5183MaRDI QIDQ6565784FDOQ6565784
Authors: Peter Achim, Jan Knoepfle 
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Reputation for Quality
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Dynamic costly state verification
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
- Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
- Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting
- Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts
- Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
- Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
- Time to Come Clean? Disclosure and Inspection Policies for Green Production
- Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
- Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts
This page was built for publication: Relational enforcement
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6565784)
