Optimal multilateral contracts

DOI10.1007/BF01221199zbMath0815.90047MaRDI QIDQ1341481

Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multiple agents; costly state verification model; optimal multilateral contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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