The sound of silence: equilibrium filtering and optimal censoring in financial markets

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Publication:5197399




Abstract: Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we analyse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Poisson) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms.



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