The sound of silence: equilibrium filtering and optimal censoring in financial markets

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Publication:5197399

DOI10.1017/APR.2016.45zbMATH Open1427.91293arXiv1606.04039OpenAlexW2254025078MaRDI QIDQ5197399FDOQ5197399


Authors: Miles B. Gietzmann, A. J. Ostaszewski Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 23 September 2019

Published in: Advances in Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we analyse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Poisson) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04039




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