Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts
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Publication:481382
DOI10.1007/S10436-014-0256-7zbMATH Open1319.91153OpenAlexW2026783695MaRDI QIDQ481382FDOQ481382
Authors: Gabriel A. Madeira 
Publication date: 12 December 2014
Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/GabrielMadeira_31WP.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Credit risk (91G40) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Cites Work
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development
- Bankruptcy and firm finance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
- The effects of credit subsidies on development
- The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
- Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
Cited In (6)
- The role of lender behavior in international project finance
- Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
- Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
- The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
- Financially-constrained lawyers: an economic theory of legal disputes
- IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND FOREIGN AID
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