Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts

DOI10.1007/S10436-014-0256-7MaRDI QIDQ481382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriel A. Madeira

Publication date 12 December 2014

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/GabrielMadeira_31WP.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

credit constraintsinterest ratesinvestmentlegal enforcementmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69) Credit risk (91G40)

Recommendations

• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
• Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
• Bankruptcy and firm finance

Cites work

• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2201448 (Why is no real title available?)
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
• The effects of credit subsidies on development

Cited in

(6)

• Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
• Financially-constrained lawyers: an economic theory of legal disputes
• The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
• Financial contracting under imperfect enforcement
• IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND FOREIGN AID
• The role of lender behavior in international project finance

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