Communicating subjective evaluations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.012zbMath1419.91423OpenAlexW3123947636WikidataQ123165263 ScholiaQ123165263MaRDI QIDQ1757542

Matthias Lang

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6EFA-0

zbMATH Keywords

communicationjustificationcentralitysubjective evaluationleniencydisclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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