The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0607zbMATH Open0911.90380OpenAlexW2072264863MaRDI QIDQ1268636FDOQ1268636

Authors: David G. Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti 

Publication date: 16 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d08/d0892.pdf

Recommendations

• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent
• Impatience versus incentives
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing

zbMATH Keywords

repeated principal-agent modelconstrained-efficient equilibriuminfinite-horizon implicit contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (28)

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Attorney fees in repeated relationships
• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts
• The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Impatience versus incentives
• Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
• Communicating subjective evaluations
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Myopic agency
• Discounted quotas
• Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Even up: maintaining relationships
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
• Partnerships based on joint ownership
• Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs
• Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent

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