The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0607zbMath0911.90380OpenAlexW2072264863MaRDI QIDQ1268636

Ennio Stacchetti, David G. Pearce

Publication date: 16 May 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d08/d0892.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated principal-agent modelconstrained-efficient equilibriuminfinite-horizon implicit contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (13)

Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Even up: maintaining relationships ⋮ The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts ⋮ Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting ⋮ The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Partnerships based on joint ownership ⋮ For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment ⋮ Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism ⋮ Endogenous and exogenous commitment ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Cites Work

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• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

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