Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108846MaRDI QIDQ2295350zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Frauke von Bieberstein, Andrea Essl, Kathrin Friedrich

Publication date 13 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108846

zbMATH Keywords

contract framingincentiveslaboratory experimentreciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• Framing of incentives and effort provision
• Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history

Cited in

(3)

• Coordination under loss contracts
• Framing of incentives and effort provision
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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