Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0011MaRDI QIDQ2867530zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Suren Basov, M. Ishaq Bhatti

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

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(3)

• How to build stable relationships between people who lie and cheat
• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity

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