Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0011zbMATH Open1278.91095OpenAlexW1980934856MaRDI QIDQ2867530FDOQ2867530

Authors: Suren Basov, M. Ishaq Bhatti 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0011

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

Cited In (3)

• How to build stable relationships between people who lie and cheat
• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity

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