Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences

DOI10.3982/TE2063MaRDI QIDQ4586064zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sylvain Chassang, Christian Zehnder

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssocial preferencesinformal contractsintent-based justiceno punishment without guiltsubjective performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cited in

(6)

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining
• Honesty and informal agreements
• Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements
• Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
• Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs

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