Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2435892zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Topi Miettinen

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://edoc.mpg.de/293775

zbMATH Keywords

contractssocial normspartnershipsguiltpre-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Honesty and informal agreements
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• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
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Cites work

• A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
• Attribution and reciprocity
• Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Dynamic psychological games
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Moral norms in a partly compliant society
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Promises and Partnership
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cited in

(4)

• Honesty and informal agreements
• Honesty in the city
• Communication and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
• ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING

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