Communication and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2673212
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.008zbMath1492.91054OpenAlexW4221061020MaRDI QIDQ2673212
Sheryl Ball, Sudipta Sarangi, Eric Bahel
Publication date: 9 June 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.008
Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
- Guilt and shame: An axiomatic analysis
- Testing guilt aversion
- Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Promises and Partnership