Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1834zbMATH Open1277.91113OpenAlexW3123681358MaRDI QIDQ2867482FDOQ2867482

Authors: Wei Zhang 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1834

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentself-controlendogenous preferencesdynamic contract designendogenous softening effectendogenous toughening effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Cited In (6)

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Contractual distortions in a market with frictions
• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
• Contracts with endogenous information
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

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