Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1834MaRDI QIDQ2867482zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wei Zhang

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1834

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentself-controlendogenous preferencesdynamic contract designendogenous softening effectendogenous toughening effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cited in

(6)

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Contractual distortions in a market with frictions
• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences
• Contracts with endogenous information
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

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