Dynamic contracts and learning by doing

DOI10.1007/S11579-014-0120-6MaRDI QIDQ2351399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julien Prat

Publication date 23 June 2015

Published in Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic optimizationhuman capitaloptimal contractprincipal-agent modelstochastic productionlearning-by-doing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Existence of optimal solutions to problems involving randomness (49J55) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Persistent private information
• Stochastic differential equations for the non linear filtering problem
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

Cited in

(10)

• Calibrated incentive contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2094761 (Why is no real title available?)
• Working to learn
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Exercising flexible load contracts: Two simple strategies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 709814 (Why is no real title available?)
• Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design
• A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts

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