Implicit contracts with effort incentives

DOI10.1007/BF01227500zbMATH Open0704.90017MaRDI QIDQ917414FDOQ917414

Oliver Fabel

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

demand uncertaintydominant strategylabor contractsNash-equilibrium mechanismoptimal employment levelsprincipal-agent approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information
• Optimal Production and Allocation Under Uncertainty
• Risk Independence and Multiattributed Utility Functions
• Under- and overemployment in optimal layoff contracts

Cited In (1)

• Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences

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