Endogenous and exogenous commitment

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108577zbMath1420.91081OpenAlexW2966911780WikidataQ127405656 ScholiaQ127405656MaRDI QIDQ2324706

Zachary Breig

Publication date: 12 September 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108577

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesmechanism designcommitmentrenegotiationspot contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Repeated contracting without commitment

Cites Work

• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

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