Partnerships based on joint ownership

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.007WikidataQ129640489 ScholiaQ129640489MaRDI QIDQ6494263FDOQ6494263

Authors: Matthias Blonski, Daniel Herbold 

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

relational contractsproperty rightsrenegotiationjoint ownershipcoase theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
• Prisoners' other dilemma

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