Prisoners' other dilemma

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0419-9zbMath1319.91031OpenAlexW3125709862MaRDI QIDQ2259413

Giancarlo Spagnolo, Matthias Blonski

Publication date: 4 March 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0419-9

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectioncooperationrepeated prisoner's dilemmacoordinationcollusionforgivenessstrategic riskstrategic uncertaintyperfectionsucker's payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (6)

Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games ⋮ Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism ⋮ Asymmetric social norms ⋮ The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games ⋮ Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Cites Work

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