Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2019.04.067MaRDI QIDQ2279415zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Weijun Zeng, Hongfeng Ai, Man Zhao

Publication date 12 December 2019

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.04.067

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationiterated prisoner's dilemma gameco-evolutionary learningfuture interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
• Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
• Expectation driven by update willingness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Prisoners' other dilemma
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Strategizing niceness in co-opetition: the case of knowledge exchange in supply chain innovation projects
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games

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