Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2019.04.067zbMath1429.91042OpenAlexW2944729341MaRDI QIDQ2279415

Weijun Zeng, Man Zhao, Hongfeng Ai

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.04.067

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationiterated prisoner's dilemma gameco-evolutionary learningfuture interaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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