Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:2279415
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2019.04.067zbMATH Open1429.91042OpenAlexW2944729341MaRDI QIDQ2279415FDOQ2279415
Weijun Zeng, Man Zhao, Hongfeng Ai
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.04.067
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