Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences

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Publication:4530939


DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00024zbMath1020.91009MaRDI QIDQ4530939

Ady Pauzner, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00024


91A05: 2-person games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games


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