On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
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Publication:1934843
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.001zbMath1255.91037OpenAlexW1979303379MaRDI QIDQ1934843
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.001
Related Items (5)
A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games ⋮ Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
Cites Work
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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