On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.001zbMath1255.91037OpenAlexW1979303379MaRDI QIDQ1934843

Bo Chen

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesheterogenous discountingeffective minimax values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax procedures in statistical decision theory (62C20) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games ⋮ Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors

Cites Work

• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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