The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
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Publication:4302554
DOI10.2307/2951740zbMath0806.90136OpenAlexW1980335314MaRDI QIDQ4302554
Publication date: 27 September 1994
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951740
complete informationdiscountingfolk theoremseffective minimax payoffsubgame perfect equilibria in repeated games
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Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring ⋮ On asynchronously repeated games ⋮ Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games ⋮ Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model ⋮ On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting ⋮ Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Optimal strategies for selecting coordinators ⋮ Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model ⋮ Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? ⋮ Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities ⋮ The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games ⋮ Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
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