On the size and structure of group cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.011MaRDI QIDQ996366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew Haag, Roger Lagunoff

Publication date 14 September 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269463/files/twerp650.pdf?subformat=pdfa

zbMATH Keywords

returns to scalerepeated gamesheterogeneous discount factorsmaximal average cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Equilibrium and perfection in discounted supergames
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.

Cited in

(19)

• Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
• Formation and long‐run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation
• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
• Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
• Sharing and growth in general random multiplicative environments
• The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
• Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation -- an experimental analysis
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Cycles of cooperation and free-riding in social systems
• On dynamic compromise
• Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Trust in cohesive communities
• Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks
• Group inefficiency in a common property resource game with asymmetric players
• Group size effects in social evolution
• Group cooperation under uncertainty
• Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
• Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups

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