Pollution claim settlements under private information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7zbMATH Open0687.90027OpenAlexW2080615930WikidataQ56803973 ScholiaQ56803973MaRDI QIDQ1263508FDOQ1263508

Authors: Rafael Rob 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism-designnearby residentspollution-generating firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
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Cited In (27)

• One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
• The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
• Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
• Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy
• Pollution claim settlements under correlated information
• Mechanism design and intentions
• On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Provision of a public good with bounded cost
• Efficient compromising
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Pollution policy: The role for publicly provided information
• Public goods with congestion
• Multibidding game under uncertainty
• Provision of public goods in a large economy
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Large nonanonymous repeated games
• Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• To sell public or private goods
• Limits of markets and limits of governments: an introduction to a symposium on political economy

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