Pollution claim settlements under private information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7zbMath0687.90027OpenAlexW2080615930WikidataQ56803973 ScholiaQ56803973MaRDI QIDQ1263508

Rafael Rob

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90022-7

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism-designnearby residentspollution-generating firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (25)

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Efficient compromising ⋮ One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Provision of a public good with bounded cost ⋮ Multibidding game under uncertainty ⋮ Public goods with congestion ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ Large nonanonymous repeated games ⋮ Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case ⋮ On the size and structure of group cooperation ⋮ Pollution claim settlements under correlated information ⋮ Provision of public goods in a large economy ⋮ Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations ⋮ Pivotal players and the characterization of influence ⋮ To sell public or private goods ⋮ Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information ⋮ Limits of markets and limits of governments: an introduction to a symposium on political economy ⋮ On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information ⋮ Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Optimal Auction Design
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

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