Pollution claim settlements under correlated information

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2374MaRDI QIDQ1268595zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Pesendorfer

Publication date 18 October 1998

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2374

zbMATH Keywords

free-riding problemimplementabilityincentive compatible mechanismspolluting plant

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3278947 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Pollution claim settlements under private information

Cited in

(3)

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• Budget-balancing incentive mechanisms
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