Continuity in auction design

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90064-BzbMath0747.90030MaRDI QIDQ1181229

Jacques Robert

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversion; limited liability; auctioneer's optimal expected gain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction