Recommendations
Cites work
- A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
- Continuity in auction design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
Cited in
(16)- Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1434021 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation with contingent contracts
- Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
- Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
- Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure
- Designing contracts and information jointly
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- Optimal design of uptime-guarantee contracts under IGFR valuations and convex costs
- Optimal contract design for an efficient secondary spectrum market
- Learning approximately optimal contracts
- Raising and allocation capital principles as optimal managerial contracts
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