Optimal contract design for an efficient secondary spectrum market

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14MaRDI QIDQ2840933zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shang-Pin Sheng, Mingyan Liu

Publication date 24 July 2013

Published in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14

zbMATH Keywords

incentivescontract designsecondary spectrum marketquality of service constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• Dynamic Contract Trading in Spectrum Markets
• NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
• Optimality of Myopic Sensing in Multichannel Opportunistic Access

Cited in

(4)

• Reservation policies for revenue maximization from secondary spectrum access in cellular networks
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7042480 (Why is no real title available?)
• Combining spot and futures markets: a hybrid market approach to dynamic spectrum access
• Tiered spectrum measurement markets for licensed secondary spectrum

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