Optimal contract design for an efficient secondary spectrum market

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14zbMATH Open1268.91097OpenAlexW70792316MaRDI QIDQ2840933FDOQ2840933

Authors: Shang-Pin Sheng, Mingyan Liu 

Publication date: 24 July 2013

Published in: Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_14

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zbMATH Keywords

incentivescontract designsecondary spectrum marketquality of service constraint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
• Optimality of Myopic Sensing in Multichannel Opportunistic Access
• Dynamic Contract Trading in Spectrum Markets

Cited In (4)

• Reservation policies for revenue maximization from secondary spectrum access in cellular networks
• Combining spot and futures markets: a hybrid market approach to dynamic spectrum access
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Tiered spectrum measurement markets for licensed secondary spectrum

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