On oligopoly spectrum allocation game in cognitive radio networks with capacity constraints

DOI10.1016/J.COMNET.2009.11.018MaRDI QIDQ969012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuedong Xu, John C. S. Lui, Dah-Ming Chiu

Publication date 11 May 2010

Published in Computer Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/0903.3278

zbMATH Keywords

chaosbifurcationNash equilibriumbounded rationalitycognitive radiobest response functiondynamic spectrum sharingoligopoly pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

Abstract: Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization in the future wireless networks. The flexible spectrum management provides new opportunities for licensed primary user and unlicensed secondary users to reallocate the spectrum resource efficiently. In this paper, we present an oligopoly pricing framework for dynamic spectrum allocation in which the primary users sell excessive spectrum to the secondary users for monetary return. We present two approaches, the strict constraints (type-I) and the QoS penalty (type-II), to model the realistic situation that the primary users have limited capacities. In the oligopoly model with strict constraints, we propose a low-complexity searching method to obtain the Nash Equilibrium and prove its uniqueness. When reduced to a duopoly game, we analytically show the interesting gaps in the leader-follower pricing strategy. In the QoS penalty based oligopoly model, a novel variable transformation method is developed to derive the unique Nash Equilibrium. When the market information is limited, we provide three myopically optimal algorithms "StrictBEST", "StrictBR" and "QoSBEST" that enable price adjustment for duopoly primary users based on the Best Response Function (BRF) and the bounded rationality (BR) principles. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our analysis and demonstrate the fast convergence of "StrictBEST" as well as "QoSBEST" to the Nash Equilibrium. For the "StrictBR" algorithm, we reveal the chaotic behaviors of dynamic price adaptation in response to the learning rates.

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Cited in

(13)

• A spectrum allocation algorithm based on game theory with price mechanism
• Entry, competition, and regulation in cognitive radio scenarios: a simple game theory model
• Inter-operator spectrum sharing from a game theoretical perspective
• Optimizing spectrum trading in cognitive mesh network using machine learning
• Reservation policies for revenue maximization from secondary spectrum access in cellular networks
• On spectrum sharing games
• QoS-aware distributed spectrum sharing for heterogeneous wireless cognitive networks
• Tying mechanism for airlines' air cargo capacity allocation
• A Stackelberg game approach to distributed spectrum management
• Computation of an Equilibrium in Spectrum Markets for Cognitive Radio Networks
• Nonlinear dynamics of discrete time multi-level leader-follower games
• SOFA: strategyproof online frequency allocation for multihop wireless networks
• Optimal contract design for an efficient secondary spectrum market

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