Communication of preferences in contests for contracts

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0525-2MaRDI QIDQ690687zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date 28 November 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0525-2

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcontestsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation
• Two-stage contests with preferences over style
• Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation
• Price competition for an informed buyer

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Why banks should keep secrets

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Pre-contest communication incentives
• Two-stage contests with preferences over style
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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