Optimal information exchange in contests

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102518MaRDI QIDQ2237879zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen

Publication date 28 October 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102518

zbMATH Keywords

contestsall-pay auctioninformation sharinginformation disclosureinformation exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Information in Tullock contests
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests

Cites work

• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Political disagreement and information in elections
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

Cited in

(7)

• Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

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