Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103157MaRDI QIDQ6930991zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zeng Lian, Shuo Xu, Jie Zheng

Publication date 11 September 2025

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103157

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationconstrained information designendogenous learningTullock contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites work

• Convex Analysis
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• Signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous rivals
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

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