The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.08.038MaRDI QIDQ1672595zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xin Feng, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.038

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncontestsinformation disclosurestochastic entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

Cites work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Contests with a stochastic number of players

Cited in

(17)

• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
• Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• The perils of friendly oversight
• Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
• On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result
• Diversification and information in contests
• Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction
• Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game
• Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
• A model of parallel contests
• Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry

This page was built for publication: The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1672595)