The perils of friendly oversight

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105500MaRDI QIDQ2675405zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Gerardi, Edoardo Grillo, Ignacio Monzón

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105500

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissionmoral hazardoversightpersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Insight by oversight
• Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
• Influence in the face of impunity
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
• The perils of nominal targets

Cites work

• A theory of political gridlock
• Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
• Microeconomic theory
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Pivotal persuasion
• Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• The value of recommendations

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