Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments

DOI10.3982/TE3329MaRDI QIDQ5121486zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bård Harstad, Antoine Loeper

Publication date 14 September 2020

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3329

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdynamic gamespolitical economypolitical instruments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) History, political science (91F10)

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