Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2442858zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2243527/132227_Monitored_by_your_friends_not_your_foes_Strategic_ignorance_and_the_delegation_of_real_authority.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delegationreal authoritystrategic ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Authority and communication in the laboratory
• Information, authority, and corporate hierarchies
• Informational control and organizational design
• Delegation and motivation
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority

Cites work

• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• A review of WTA/WTP studies
• Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion
• Authority and communication in the laboratory
• Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights

Cited in

(4)

• Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: a laboratory experiment
• The perils of friendly oversight
• Unobserved Delegation
• Authority and communication in the laboratory

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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