Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003zbMath1292.91047MaRDI QIDQ2442858

Ferdinand A. von Siemens, Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2243527/132227_Monitored_by_your_friends_not_your_foes_Strategic_ignorance_and_the_delegation_of_real_authority.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delegation; strategic ignorance; real authority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Authority and communication in the laboratory, Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: a laboratory experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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