Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2222221
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.002zbMath1457.91095OpenAlexW3092483344MaRDI QIDQ2222221
Publication date: 26 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.002
public disclosurediscriminatory powerimperfectly discriminating contestprivate disclosure over groups
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
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