Information disclosure on the contest mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.10.002MaRDI QIDQ2222221zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xin Feng

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

public disclosurediscriminatory powerimperfectly discriminating contestprivate disclosure over groups

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Pivotal persuasion
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The optimal accuracy level in asymmetric contests

Cited in

(11)

• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• Contagion management through information disclosure
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
• Diversification and information in contests
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests
• Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types

This page was built for publication: Information disclosure on the contest mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2222221)