Information disclosure on the contest mechanism

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.002zbMath1457.91095OpenAlexW3092483344MaRDI QIDQ2222221

Xin Feng

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

public disclosurediscriminatory powerimperfectly discriminating contestprivate disclosure over groups

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
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