Contagion management through information disclosure

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105837zbMATH Open1544.91086MaRDI QIDQ6564046FDOQ6564046

Jonas Hedlund, Allan Hernandez-Chanto, Carlos Oyarzun

Publication date: 28 June 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

contagionstrategic complementsstrategic substitutesobfuscationinformation designfull-disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation

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