Contagion management through information disclosure

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105837MaRDI QIDQ6564046zbMATHFDO

Authors Jonas Hedlund, Allan Hernandez-Chanto, Carlos Oyarzun

Publication date 28 June 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

contagionstrategic complementsstrategic substitutesobfuscationinformation designfull-disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Disclosure in epidemics
• Information disclosure and vaccination externalities
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107836 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Global manipulation by local obfuscation
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks

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